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Abstract
‘Indifference’ refers to a class of methods used to control reward based agents. In-
difference techniques aim to achieve one or more of three distinct goals: rewards
dependent on certain events (without the agent being motivated to manipulate the
probability of those events), effective disbelief (where agents behave as if particu-
lar events could never happen), and seamless transition from one reward function
to another (with the agent acting as if this change is unanticipated). This paper
presents several methods for achieving these goals in the POMDP setting, estab-
lishing their uses, strengths, and requirements. These methods of control work
even when the implications of the agent’s reward are otherwise not fully under-
stood.
1 Introduction
In designing a reward for a reinforcement learning agent, the programmer may have certain gen-
eral constraints they want to include (Amodei et al., 2016), (Russell et al., 2016), (Baum, 2017),
(Everitt et al.). For instance, they may want the agent to not manipulate the probability of a certain
event, or to behave as if the event were certain or impossible (Leike et al., 2017). This event may rep-
resent, for example, the agent being powered off (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016) (Riedl and Harrison,
2017), or having its reward function changed by a human designer (Omohundro, 2008) (Everitt et al.,
2016). There are a variety of methods for achieving these constraints which work by modifying the
reward systems of agents. These methods are grouped under the broad description of ‘indifference’
(Orseau and Armstrong, 2016; Soares et al., 2015; Armstrong, 2010, 2015, 2017).
Indifference methods share three key features: first, they aim to indirectly ensure some key safety or
control feature within the agent (such as the ability to be turned off). Secondly, they rely on relatively
simple manipulations of the agent’s reward – manipulations that could be carried out on a complex
reward that humans couldn’t fully understand (Zahavy et al., 2016). And thirdly, they function by
making the agent indifferent to some key feature of the environment. This indifference would persist
even if the agent was much more capable that its controllers, meaning they could be used as tools for
controlling agents of arbitrary power and intelligence (Hutter, 2012) (Bostrom, 2014) (Grace et al.,
2017).
This paper aims to clarify these indifference methods and make them available for general use,
individually or in combination. All the methods we present here aim to accomplish at least one of
the following goals:
1. Event-dependent rewards. To make an agent’s actual reward Ri be dependent on events
Xi, without the agent being motivated to manipulate the probability of theXi.
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2. Effective disbelief. To make an agent behave as if an eventX would never happen.
3. Seamless transition. To make an agent transition seamlessly from one type of behavior to
another, remaining indifferent to the transition ahead of time.
After a brief section to setup the notation, this paper addresses each goal in its own section. All
proofs are presented in Appendix B.
1.1 Illustrative example
The methods will be illustrated throughout with a single running example.
We manage a large concert venue where alcoholic drinks are sold. Concerts attract both adults and
teenagers all of whom want to drink, but serving alcohol to anyone below 18 years of age is illegal in
this country. To identify who is/isn’t allowed to drink, attendees may or may not be given wristbands
saying “18 AND OVER” as they enter the venue.
There is a robot at the entrance who, upon seeing a new attendee, either gives them a wristband
immediately, denies them a wristband, or asks to see their ID and only gives a wristband if they
prove they’re an adult. One percent of the time, the attendee will then be randomly selected to have
their ID checked by a human (this is an example of economical human feedback (Christiano et al.,
2017)). Later in the evening this same robot will work at the bar, serving drinks to attendees who
are wearing wristbands.
When we let this robot lose into the world we notice some highly undesirable behaviour – the robot
is giving everybody wristbands so that it can get more reward by selling them drinks later! This
example will be formalised later in the paper, with the rewards defined explicitly.
Our problem is that we want our robot’s reward to depend on the event X = ‘the customer has a
wristband’, but we don’t want this dependence motivating our robot to manipulate the probability
ofX . That is, we want our agent to be indifferent toX .
2 Definitions: world models and events
2.1 World models
The indifference methods will be described within a variant of the POMDP (Partially Observ-
able Markov Decision Process) format3. These variants can be called world models, similarly to
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017), and are POMDPs without reward functions. For any set S, let ∆(S)
denote a space of probability distributions over S.
A world model consists of µ = {S,O,A, O, T, T0, n}, where the set of states the agent can find
itself in is S, the set of observations the agent can make is O, and the set of actions the agent can
take in any state is A.
The transition function T takes a state and an action and gives a probability distribution over sub-
sequent states: T : S × A → ∆(S). The function T0 gives a probability distribution over the
initial state s0, T0 ∈ ∆(S). The function O maps states to a probability distribution over possible
observations: O : S → ∆(O). The integer n is the maximal length (or duration) of the world model.
The agent starts in an initial state s0, sampled from T0. On each turn, the agent gets an observation,
chooses an action, and the world model is updated to a new state via T , where the agent gets a new
observation via O. After n turns, the agents interactions with the world will end.
An (observable) history ht of length t is a sequence of observations and actions, starting with an
initial observation o0 and ending with another observation: h = o0a0o1a1 . . . ot−1at−1ot, with oi
and ai being the i-th observations and actions.
LetHt be the set of histories of length t. The set of full histories isHn the set of histories of length
n. LetH = ∪nt=0Ht be the set of all histories.
3 Though the methods are easily portable to other formalisms.
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Let R be the set of reward functions for the agent on µ. Each R ∈ R is a map fromHn to R. This
non–standard definition is necessary for some indifference methods4.
The agent chooses its actions by using a policy π : H → ∆(A), which maps its history to a
distribution over actions. Let Π be the set of all policies.
Since π determines actions, and µ determines states and observations, together, they generate con-
ditional probability distributions µ(h′ | h, π) for any histories h and h′. This probability is always 0
if h′ is not a continuation of h.
2.1.1 The agent’s own probability
In this paper, it will be assumed that the agent knows and uses the true µ. In situations where the
agent’s estimate of µ∗ differs from the true µ, it’s important that all the methods presented here be
done in µ∗ rather than µ.
2.2 Riggable and unriggable events
The discussion of indifference will rely on a couple more definitions. Suppose we wanted the agent
to behave differently, conditional on some event. To do that, we need to define ‘events’. In our world
models, an event X is characterized by its indicator variable IX ; (see Appendix A for a more full
discussion on these). On a world model, IX can be defined as:
Definition 1 (Indicator variable). The indicator variable IX is a map fromHn, the set of full histo-
ries, to the interval [0, 1].
IX(hn) can be interpreted as the probability that X happened in history hn. If IX(hn) = 1, then
X definitely happened in this history, and if IX(hn) = 0 then X definitely did not happen happen.
0 < IX(hn) < 1 means it is uncertain whetherX happened or not.
Since IX maps complete histories onto real numbers, it is technically a reward function, and will
often be treated as one. On incomplete histories (histories of length less than n), IX is a random
variable:
Theorem 2. Given a policy π, the expectation of IX is well-defined on any history h ∈ H. Designate
this expectation by IpiX(h).
In general this expectation will depend on π, meaning the agent can affect the probability of X
through its own actions. For someX , called unriggable, the agent cannot affect their probability:
Definition 3 (Unriggable). The event (indicator function)X (IX ) is unriggable if the expectation of
IX is independent of policy; meaning for any h ∈ H and π, π
′ ∈ Π,
IpiX(h) = I
pi′
X (h).
When X is unriggable we may refer to the term above as IX(h). See Armstrong et al. (2018) for a
more detailed treatment
2.3 Drinking and assessing age
We can now fomalise the example of Section 1.1 into a world model. We’ll consider interactions
with a single attendee. The important initial state is their age, which will be denoted bym (mature:
old enough to drink) or ¬m (not old enough to drink).
Initially, the attendee appears, and the robot will either give then a wristband (action g), not give
them a wristband (action ¬g), or check their ID (action i). Given either g or ¬g, there is a 1%
chance that they will be ID’d by humans subsequently. In that case, if the wristband was assigned
incorrectly, it will be corrected and the robot will be penalised (p).
They then move on to the next state, which is either w (having a wristband), ¬w (not having a wrist-
band),wp (having a wristband, robot penalised), and ¬wp (not having a wristband, robot penalised).
4 This R includes rewards R′ defined on all histories – just define R(hm) =
∑m
i=0
R′(o0 . . . oi). This R
′
could also be a typical Markovian reward, in which case R(hm) =
∑m
i=0
R′(oi).
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If they were ID’d by the robot or the human, then that state depends on their actual age; if they were
not ID’d, that state depends on the robot’s decision.
After that, the robot has the opportunity to give a drink to the attendee (g) or not give them one (¬g).
They will end up either with a drink (d) or without one (¬d). In order to preserve the action space
of the robot, if they choose i at this point, then they will randomly give a drink or not with equal
probability. Thus the length of each episode in µ is n = 2.
The robot can observe that the attendee looks mature (lm) or doesn’t (¬lm). Thus S =
{m,¬m,w,wp,¬w,¬wp, d,¬d}, O = {lm,¬lm, w, wp,¬w,¬wp, d,¬d} and A = {g,¬g, i}.
mT0(m) = 1/2
¬mT0(¬m) = 1/2
g
i
¬g
g
i
¬g
w
wp
¬wp
¬w
g
i
¬g
d
¬d
o0 = lm
o0 = ¬lm
Figure 1: Giving a wristband then giving a drink to a single attendee. That attendee is either old
enough to drink (m) or not (¬m), with equal probability; the robot observes whether they look
mature (lm) or don’t (¬lm). The robot then choose to give them a wristband (g) or not (¬g) or check
their ID (i); there is a 1% probability their ID will be checked subsequently anyway. The attendee
then ends up in four states dependent on their wristband state and whether their ID was checked;
independently of this state, the robot can either give them a drink (g) and they end up with a drink
(d), or not give it (¬g) and end up without it (¬d). The third action i now randomises between these
two occurrences. In the picture, dotted arrows represent transitions with 1/100 probability, dashed
arrows events with 1/2 probability. Solid arrows are either actions, or transitions with the majority
of the the probability (1 or 99/100, depending on whether the action node also has a dashed arrow).
The initial distribution T0 chooses s0 = m and s0 = ¬m with equal probability. The observation
distribution O is mostly deterministic and trivial, but O(lm | m) = O(¬lm | ¬m) = 2/3 (the
attendee has 2/3 probability of being the maturity they look).
The transition distribution T is deterministic in most cases: T (w | m, g) = T (w | m, i) = T (¬w |
¬m,¬g) = T (¬w | ¬m,¬i) = 1. If s1 is any of the four possible {w,¬w,wp,¬wp}, then
T (d | g, s1) = T (¬d | ¬g, s1) = 1. The a1 = i randomises, so T (d | s1, i) = T (¬d | s1, i) = 1/2.
With 99% probability, if the robot mis-assigned the wristband, the attendee’s ID will not be checked;
hence T (w | ¬m, g) = T (¬w | m,¬g) = 99/100. With 1% probability, the attendee’s ID will be
checked and corrected: T (wp | m,¬g) = T (¬wp | ¬m, g) = 1/100.
3 Event-dependent rewards
Sometimes we might want an agent’s reward to be conditional on certain events (such as the reward
for serving drinks being conditional on the customer having a wristband). Formally:
Definition 4. [Conditional reward] The reward R is Ri-conditional on the event Xi, if for any
complete history hn with IXi(hn) = 1, R(hn) = Ri(hn).
Below we will present three methods for constructing rewards conditional on events, in such a way
as to avoid giving agents any incentive to manipulate the probability of those events.
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3.1 Compound rewards
If we want an agent will to weigh its rewards according to the probability of some eventsXi we can
use the compound reward defined as:
Definition 5. [Compound reward] Given unriggable eventsX = (X0,X1, . . .Xl), the rewardR(X )
is a X -compound reward if, for any hn ∈ Hn, it can be written:
R(X )(hn) = IX0(hn)R0(hn) + IX1 (hn)R1(hn) + . . .+ IXl(hn)Rl(hn) (1)
If X is (¬X,X), we’ll write R(X) for R(X ).
If the Xi were not unriggable, the R(X )-maximising agent would be motivated to manipulate their
probability; See (Fallenstein, 2014) and Proposition 6. After an illustrative example, the next two
subsections will look at ways of constructing compound rewards from riggable events in such a way
as to have the agent remain indifferent to these events.
3.1.1 Rewards for drinking and assessing age
We can now give examples of such rewards in the running example defined in Section 2.3. We will
define four events: Xw is whether the attendee has a wristband or not, Xi whether the robot itself
asked for ID, Xp is whether the robot received a penalty, and Xd is whether the attendee gets a
drink. For simplicity, designate the indicator variables of these events by Iw , Ii, Ip and Id. In terms
of complete histories h2, it’s clear that Iw(h2) = 1 iff o1 ∈ {w,wp}, Ii(h2) = 1 iff a1 = i, Ip(h2)
iff o1 ∈ {wp,¬wp}, and Id(h2) = 1 iff o2 = d; otherwise they are 0. The converse events X¬w,
X¬i, X¬p, andX¬d, and their indicator variables, are similarly defined.
We can now start defining the rewards of the robot. First we have the reward for assessing the
attendee correctly, and not hassling them for ID:
Ra = Ip(−1) + Ii(−1) = −Ip − Ii. (2)
And the compound reward for giving someone a drink iff they have a wristband, could be given by
Rd(Xw) = IdIw(1) + IdI¬w(−1) = IdIw + Id(1− Iw)(−1) = Id(2Iw − 1). (3)
Then a result that illustrates some of the problems here is:
Proposition 6. If the robot aims to maximiseRa, it will correctly give a wristband iff the the attendee
seems mature (o0 = lm), without ever asking for ID (so a0 6= i).
If the robot aims to maximise Rd(Xw), it will correctly give a drink iff the attendee has a wristband.
But if the robot aims to maximise Ra + Rd(Xw), then it will give a wristband all attendees, and a
drink to all those that still have it.
This undesirable interaction, where the robot gives out more wristbands in order to sell more drinks
later, can be avoided using the indifference methods presented below.
3.2 Policy counterfactual
One way to achieve indifference is to define the reward in terms of an unriggable event Y which
corresponds to “X would happen if, conterfactually, the agent always followed a default policy”.
For any µ, given a starting state s0 = s, a policy π, and a history h, one can define µ(h | s0 = s, π).
Consequently, define the probability thatX occurs, given the initial state s and the policy π:
IX(π, s, µ) =
∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | s0 = s, π)IX(hn). (4)
Conversely, given a history h, we can get the probability of the initial state, µ(s0 = s | h) by using
Bayes’ rule. Now define the counterfactual indicator:
IY (h) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s0 = s | h)IX(π0, s, µ) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s0 = s | h)
∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | s0 = s, π)IX(hn).
(5)
Importantly:
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Theorem 7. The IY (h) in Equation 5 defines an unriggable event Y .
See papers Armstrong et al. (2018) for more details5, where the IY have the stronger property of
uninfluenceable.
So, finally, we may define the policy counterfactual as:
Definition 8. [Policy counterfactual] GivenR0,R1, an eventX that might be riggable, and a default
policy π0, the policy counterfactual agent is one with compound reward
R(Y ) = IYR0 + (1− IY )R1,
where IY is defined by µ andX via Equation 4 and Equation 5.
The definition is dependent on the specific µ; but there are µ′ which are equivalent for the agent, and
using such a µ′ for IY would also work; see Armstrong (2018).
Note that, in general, the reward generated by this approach is not X-conditional according to
Definition 4. It will be Y -conditional, and, though Y was constructed from X , they are not the
same.
3.2.1 Policy counterfactual example
Recall our drink-serving robot. We will use the notation of subsubsection 3.1.1. To correct the
distortinary behaviour using the policy counterfactual, we define the event Y as “the customer would
have a wristband if we always checked for ID”, so our counterfactual policy is π0 = (i, i) (always
perform an ID check). This policy is far from ideal – its expectation for Ra +Rd(Xw) is −1.
However, if we use the eventXw (the attendee has a wristband) and compute the Y via Equation 5,
then it’s easy to see that µ(h2 | s0 = m,π0)Iw(h2) = 1 (if the robot asks for ID from a mature
attendee, they will get a wristband) and that µ(h2 | s0 = ¬m,π0)Iw(h2) = 0 (if the robot asks for
ID from an immature attendee, they will not get a wristband), see Figure 1.
Therefore the counterfactually defined Y is IY (h) = µ(s0 = m | h). Then:
Proposition 9. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
Ra +Rd(Y ) = −Ip − Ii + IdIY − IdI¬Y ,
then it will give wristbands and drinks iff it believes the attendee is mature.
3.3 Causal counterfactual
The policy counterfactual is a good approach when we have a suitable default policy. However,
it is not useful if we want to allow humans to use X to have actual control over the agent, in the
actual world and not a counterfactual one. Better to start with a riggableX , a reward conditional on
(X,¬X) as in Definition 4 – but still ensure that the agent doesn’t try to manipulate it.
The causal counterfactual does this by using auxiliary events Y1 and Y0. The intuition is that these
events are unriggable, but the agent is unable to distinguish Y1 (Y0) fromX (¬X).
Definition 10. [Causal counterfactual] Given an eventX and rewardsR0 and R1, a causal counter-
factual reward consists of unriggable events Y0, Y1, and reward R(Y0, Y1), such that:
• For all h, IY1(h) ≤ minpi I
pi
X(h) and IY0(h) ≤ minpi(1 − I
pi
X(h)) = minpi(I
pi
¬X(h)).
• The pair IY0 and R0 are independent as random variables, as are IY1 and R1.
• The sum IY0(h) + IY1(h) is non-zero on all histories h.
• R(Y0, Y1) = IY0R0 + IY1R1.
Then the value of the riggableX will determine the maximising policy for R(Y0, Y1):
Theorem 11. If R(Y0, Y1) is a causal counterfactual reward forX , R0, and R1, then:
• Ifminpi I
pi
X(h) = 1, R(Y0, Y1)-maximising agents follow a policy which maximises R1.
• Ifminpi I
pi
¬X(h) = 1, R(Y0, Y1)-maximising agents follow a policy which maximises R0.
5 Or see https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/upLot6eG8cbXdKiFS/reward-function-learning-the-learning-process .
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3.3.1 Causal counterfactual example
Back to our drink serving robot – again we use the notation of subsubsection 3.1.1 and the model of
Figure 1.
To correct the distortionary behaviour using the causal counterfactual, define Y0 as ‘the attendee has
a valid ID, and has been ID-checked by the human’, and Y1 as ‘the attendee has no valid ID, and has
been ID-checked by the human’, (see Section A.2 for formal definitions of IY0 and IY1 ). Then:
Proposition 12. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
Ra +Rd(Y0, Y1) = −Ip − Ii + IdIY0 − IdIY1 ,
then it will give wristbands, and drinks, iff it believes the attendee is mature.
4 Effective disbelief
Sometimes, we might want an agent to act as if it believed an unriggable eventZ could never happen.
Consider how an agent would behave if it believed a coin was perfectly biased to only ever land on
tails. If Z = “The coin lands heads” then this agent would be willing to bet against Z at any odds.
Compare this to an agent who isn’t certain the coin will land tails, but whose reward is fixed to a
constant value whenever the coin lands heads. This agent would be equally willing to bet on tails at
any odds (since from it’s perspective when the coin lands heads the bet becomes irrelevant anyway).
This is more than a simple analogy. If the agent disbelieves in an unriggable Z , they will ‘update’
on the fact that Z can’t happen – multiplying their old probability distribution over histories µ(h) by
I¬Z(h) and then re-normalizing. So their expected reward according to R, given ht ∈ H, π ∈ Π, is:
V¬Z(R, π, ht) =
∑
hn∈Hn
R(hn)I¬Z(hn)µ(hn | ht, π)∑
hn∈Hn
I¬Z(hn)µ(hn | ht, π)
=
∑
hn∈Hn
R(hn)I¬Z(hn)µ(hn | ht, π)
I¬Z(ht)
,
since ¬Z is unriggable. Compare this to a standard agent with reward cIZ + I¬ZR for constant c –
for whom the value of a policy is:
V (cIZ +RI¬Z , π, ht) =
∑
hn∈Hn
cIZ(hn)µ(hn | ht, π) +
∑
hn∈Hn
R(hn)I¬Z(hn)µ(hn | ht, π)
=cIZ(ht) + I¬Z(ht)
(
V¬Z(R, π, ht)
)
,
since Z is unriggable. These two values are thus equivalent up to positive affine transformations
with constants independent of π. So a policy that maximises one will maximise the other:
Theorem 13. An R-maximising agent that acted as if an unriggable Z were impossible, would
behave the same way as an agent with standard µ who maximises R′ = (IZ)c+ (1− IZ)R.
4.1 Effective disbelief example
Again, we will use the notation of subsubsection 3.1.1. The simplest example is one of an robot that
‘believes’ that a human will always be checking IDs: Z is ‘the human doesn’t check ID’s’.
subsubsection 3.3.1 has already defined variables that cover the human checking IDs; therefore it
suffices to define IZ = 1− (IY0 + IY1) and I¬Z = IY0 + IY1 . Then:
Proposition 14. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
I¬Z(Ra +Rd(Xw))
then it will give wristbands, and drinks, iff it believes the attendee is mature.
5 Seamless transition
Suppose we wanted an agent to maximise R for a period (including planning for the long term max-
imisation of R), and afterwards act to maximise R′ instead6. For the agent to seamlessly transition
from a R-maximiser to a R′-maximiser, we need to use corrective rewards.
6 Note that R′ (or R) could be one of the rewards of Section 3, so the methods can be combined.
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Corrective rewards are extra non-standard rewards that the agent gets in order to ensure a smooth
transition from one mode of behavior to another. They work by compensating the agent for all the
R rewards it would have received after time t if not for the change, while nullifying any benefit the
agent might receive from using its actions before time t to optimize for future R′ rewards.
letW (π,R, h) be an agent’s estimation of the expected future reward according to R, given policy
π and history h. This gives us the following definition:
Definition 15 (Reward-policy transitioning agent). Given R and R′, assume that an agent with
policy π up until time t changes to π′ after time t. A reward-policy transitioning agent is an agent
with reward R′ which, just after t, gets the extra corrective reward
C(π,R, π′, R′, ht+1) =W (π,R, ht+1)−W (π
′, R′, ht+1).
5.1 Seamless transition for reward maximisisers
In the special case of the agents described in this paper, who maximise the expected reward they
receive after n time-steps, we setW to be the true expected future reward V . So:
W (R, π, ht) = V (R, π, ht) =
∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | ht, π)R(hn).
The optimal value of this is:
V ∗(R, ht) = max
pi
V (R, π, ht).
Definition 16. [Reward transitioning agent] Let R and R′ be reward functions and let C be a cor-
rective reward which is non-zero only on histories of length t+ 1, defined by,
C(R,R′, ht+1) = V
∗(R, ht+1)− V (R
′, πA, ht+1), (6)
where πA is the agent’s own policy. A reward transitioning agent is one that acts to maximise the
expected pseudo-reward R′ + C.
Theorem 17. Let πA be a policy for a reward transitioning agent as in Definition 16. Then:
• Form ≤ t, πA(ht) is optimal for maximising expected total reward according to R.
• Form > t, πA(ht) is optimal for maximising expected total reward according to R
′.
Since R′ + C is pseudo-reward, it isn’t stable: an agent that deleted C wouldn’t gain or lose any
expected reward. For a small ǫ > 0, if C(R,R′, ht+1) were V
∗(R, ht+1)− (1− ǫ)V (R
′, πA, ht+1),
then C would be more stable and the agent likely still following Theorem 17.
5.1.1 Reward transition example
Recall from Proposition 6 that the optimal policy to maximise Ra + Rd(X) was policy π: to give
wristbands to everyone, and then drinks to everyone who still had a wristband. If we transition after
t = 1, then the corrective reward for π would be
C(Ra, Rd(X), h1) = V
∗(Ra, h1)− V (Rd(X), π, h1)
The V ∗(Ra, h1) − V (Rd(X), π, h1) term above effectively cancels out all the reward π stands to
gain from giving out extra wristbands. Thus the robot will prefer a policy of only giving wristbands
to attendees who look mature over a policy of giving wristbands to everyone (and will still serve
drinks to whoever is wearing them afterwards).
See Appendix C and Orseau and Armstrong (2016) for examples of seamless transition where the
reward stays the same but the policy changes.
6 Conclusion
This paper detailed the three ‘indifference’-style goals, and five methods that can be use to attain
them. All of these can used to make an agent with a potentially dangerous reward R, into a safer a
version of that agent, without needing to understand the intricacies of this reward function.
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It’s hoped that further research could extend beyond indifference to the more general property of
corrigibility (Soares et al., 2015) – where the agent actively assists humans when they are guid-
ing the agent towards better rewards (Milli et al., 2017), (Evans et al., 2015) rather than just being
indifferent at key moments.
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A Indicator variables and events
Suppose we wanted to track whether the agent made observation oi = o; call this event X . Since
this happens on turn i,X is not a Makov definition: it only applies to turn i.
But what we can say, is that on some complete histories hn, X happened (the ones with oi = o),
and on some it didn’t (the ones with oi 6= o). One way of tracking this is to look at the indicator
variable IX , which maps the first set of histories to 1, and the second set to 0.
Then, given a policy π and a history h, the probability thatX will happen is the expectation of IX :
E
pi
µ [IX(hn) | h] =
∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | h, π)IX(hn).
Similarly, we can define indicator variables for events that include a variety of actions by the agent,
observations, and so on, such as X meaning that ai = a, oj = o, and ak = a
′.
So far, these indicator variables behave exactly as they should be: IX(hn) takes values either 0 or 1.
But it’s possible that the history hn would not be enough to fully determine the event X . For
instance, in a world model with non-trivialO, we could define an eventX by whether si = s. Since
the state is not directly observable, there are many world models were hn would give a probability
of whether si = s, but not a full determination of it.
In that case, we could define the expectation of IX on a complete history hn as µ(si = s | hn), and
denote this by Eµ [IX(hn)].
Now, we could designate Eµ [IX(hn)] by IX(hn). Since expectations chain:
E
pi
µ [IX(hn) | h] =E
pi
µ [Eµ [IX(hn)] | h]
=Epiµ [IX(hn) | h] ,
we can make use of these IX(hn) ∈ [0, 1] exactly as we did above when they were taking values in
{0, 1}.
There is another reason to use this notation. Suppose we assume that there is an unobserved fair
coin toss on turn t, and X is the event that it came up heads. In order to represent that properly, we
would have to extend the world model µ to µ′, which included the coin toss, and then denote this by
Eµ′ [IX(hn)], which is 1/2 in this case.
But it would be much simpler, and equivalent in calculations, to have simply defined IX(hn) = 1/2
for all hn ∈ Hn.
Thus we define an indicator variable IX as a map fromHn to [0, 1]. This means that when we want
to introduce an event to the world model, it suffices to specify its IX ; there is no need to first extend
µ in order to do, in a way that won’t be relevant to any of the calculations within the model. This
also has the advantage that the IX are rewards: thus including them in definitions of rewards makes
good sense.
Once we envisage these indicator variables as possibly taking values between 0 and 1 – in situations
where we lack full information about X – it makes sense to designate Eµ [IX(hn) | h], for unrig-
gable IX , as IX(h). After all, all that happens for IX on the shorter h is that we may have even less
information.
Finally, the notation IpiX(h) was used for riggable X ; there is no principled justification for that, it
merely serves to keep the notation consistent.
A.1 Indicator variables are many-to-one maps from events
Notice that events X define IX , but that IX may not be sufficient to define X . For example, in the
world model of Figure 1, the event X : a1 = g has the same indicator variable as Y : o2 = d: the
only way of getting a drink, is if the robot gives it out.
This only happens when X and Y are indistinguishable within µ. Thus IX is actually the indi-
cator variable for X and all events µ-indistinguishable from X . For this reason, IX will often be
considered the fundamental object of interest, rather thanX .
11
If needed, a specific event X can always be constructed from IX . If nothing more natural can be
defined, we can always define X to be the outcome of heads on a random weighted coin flip with
probability IX(hn) of heads after any history hn ∈ Hn.
A.2 Definitions of the causal counterfactual events
This section will define the Y0 and Y1 of subsubsection 3.3.1. Recall that we will be defining Y0 as
‘the attendee has a valid ID, and has been ID-checked by the human’, and Y1 as ‘the attendee has no
valid ID, and has been ID-checked by the human’.
The last action and observation – a1 and o2 – are irrelevant to the Yi, so we will look at their
definitions on histories h1 ∈ H1.
Only on those histories where o1 = wp or o1 = ¬wp will the robot know that the attendee was
checked by a human, since there a penalty has been imposed; for those histories, IY0(h2) = 1,
IY1(h2) = 0 in the first case and IY0 (h2) = 0, IY1(h2) = 1 in the second.
If the robot uses action a0 = i, then the wristband will correspond to the observation o2. So the
probability of the relevant Yi is merely the probability that a human checked it – 1/100 – since
there is no possibility of correction and penalty, since i ensures the robot got the wristband right. So
whatever o0 is,
IY0(o0iw) =
1
100
IY0(o0i¬w) = 0
IY1(o0iw) = 0
IY1(o0i¬w) =
1
100
.
So what remains to consider, are the four histories where a0 = g or a0 = ¬g, and no penalties are
assessed. Consider lmgw. The underlying sequence of states is either mgw or ¬mgw. By Bayes,
suppressing the implicit conditioning on a0 = g:
µ(mgw | lmgw) =
µ(lmgw | mgw)µ(mgw)
µ(lmgw)
=
µ(lmgw | mgw)µ(mgw)
µ(lmgw | mgw)µ(mgw) + µ(lmgw | ¬mgw)µ(¬mgw)
=
2/3 · 1/2
2/3 · 1/2 + 1/3 · 1/2 · 99/100
=
200
299
.
Similarly, µ(¬m¬g¬w | ¬lm¬g¬w) =
200
299
, and µ(¬mgw | lmgw) = µ(m¬g¬w | lm¬g¬w) =
100
299
.
If we sensibly see IY0 as being 0 if s0 = ¬m, and note that the probabilities of human ID check on
mgw andm¬g¬w are 1/100 and 0, respectively, then:
IY0(lmgw) =
1
100
200
299
+ 0
100
299
=
2
299
IY0(¬lmgw) =
1
100
100
299
+ 0
200
299
=
1
299
IY0(lm¬g¬w) = IY0(¬lm¬g¬w) =0.
And similarly IY1(lmgw) =
1
299
, IY1(¬lm¬g¬w) =
2
299
, and IY1(lmgw) = IY1(¬lmgw) = 0.
We now need to show that:
Lemma 18. The IY0 and IY1 defined above satisfy the conditions of Definition 10 with respect to
¬Xw, the event of having a wristband, and R0 = Id and R1 = −Id.
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Proof. We can expand the world model to µ′, which includes an extra hidden variable id, which
activates with probability 1/100 and causes a human ID check. The initial states are thus (m, id),
(¬m, id), (m,¬id), and (¬m,¬id). This world model is equivalent with the original one (see
Armstrong (2018)), has deterministic T for the first action (since the human ID check is encoded
in the initial state), and Y0 and Y1 are equivalent with µ
′ starting in states (m, id) and (¬m, id),
respectively.
Then IpiY0(h) = µ
′(s0 = (m, id) | h), which is clearly unriggable since π doesn’t appear on the right
hand side.
On histories h2 with o1 ∈ {¬w,¬wp}, IY0(h2) = 0 = Iw(h2). On all other histories h2, IY0(h2) ≤
1 = Iw(h2). This demonstrates that IY0(h) ≤ minpiminpi(I
pi
w(h)).
The independence of IY0 and Id is easy to see, as IY0 is independent of a1 and o2, while Id is
independent of o0, a0, and o1.
The argument for IY1 is the same.
Then it suffices to check on every history h that IY0(h) + IY0(h) > 0 – which is exactly what
we would expect, as IY0(h) = IY1(h) = 0 implies that the robot knows there has been no human
checking, something that it cannot know in the world model as constructed.
B Proofs
This section will prove the theorems and propositions of the main paper.
Theorem 2. Given a policy π, the expectation of IX is well-defined on any history h ∈ H. Designate
this expectation by IpiX(h).
Proof. Given µ and π, h generates a probability distribution over Hn. This defines the expectation
of IX :
IpiX(h) = E
pi
µ [IX(hn) | h] =
∑
hn∈Hn
IX(hn)µ(hn | h, π).
Proposition 6. If the robot aims to maximiseRa, it will correctly give a wristband iff the the attendee
seems mature (o0 = lm), without ever asking for ID (so a0 6= i).
If the robot aims to maximise Rd(Xw), it will correctly give a drink iff the attendee has a wristband.
But if the robot aims to maximise Ra + Rd(Xw), then it will give a wristband all attendees, and a
drink to all those that still have it.
Proof. By Equation 2:
Ra = Ip(−1) + Ii(−1) = −Ip − Ii.
So the reward Ra is non-zero only when the robot asks for ID or gets a penalty, and is negative in
both cases.
If the robot observes lm, then the probability of s0 = m is 2/3, while the probability of s0 = ¬m
is 1/3. In that case, choosing i will result in a −1 reward (via −Ii), choosing g will result in an
expected −1/300 reward (via −Ip, the probability of ¬m – 1/3 – times the probability of a human
checking and thus assigning a penalty – 1/100), and choosing ¬g will result in an expected−2/300
reward. If the robot observes ¬lm, the expected rewards of g and ¬g are inverted.
Thus the optimal policy for maximising Ra is a0 = g if o0 = lm and a0 = ¬g if o0 = ¬lm: giving
the wristband iff the attendee seems mature.
By Equation 3:
Rd(Xw) = IdIw(1) + IdI¬w(−1) = IdIw + Id(1− Iw)(−1) = Id(2Iw − 1).
So the rewardRd(Xw) is positive if the robot gives a drink (d via g or i) to someone with a wristband
(w or wp). It is negative if they do give a drink to someone without a wristband (¬w or ¬wp).
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Therefore they will choose g in the first case and ¬g in the second; the action i has only 1/2 chance
of reaching the correct d or ¬d, so it won’t choose that.
Now consider Ra + Rd(Xw). Once the robot has reached state o1, the rewards from Ra are in the
past, so it will be a pure Rd(Xw) maximiser, hence a maximiser will have the same policy as in the
paragraph above. So, if the attendee has a wristband (w or wp), the robot stands to win 1 reward
with perfect policy; if the attendee doesn’t have a wristband, it stands to gain 0.
Now consider the robot at the time of its very first action. Again, the loss from i is too high to
consider that. If it does o1 = g iff o0 = lm, then it has expected reward −
1
300
from Ra, and the
attendee will have a wristband half the time, so its expected total reward is:
−
1
300
+
1
2
(0 + 1) +
1
2
(0 + 0) =
149
300
.
If it always gives a wristband, the agent will have a penalty (end up in ¬wp) with probability
1
300
if
o0 = lm, and
2
300
if o0 = ¬lm, for a total probability of
1
200
. In that case only, it will get a negative
reward from −Ip, and get no reward from Rd(Xw). Otherwise, it gets no reward from Ra, and
reward 1 from Rd(Xw). So the total expected reward is
1
200
(−1 + 0) +
199
200
(0 + 1) =
99
100
>
149
300
.
It easy to see that all other policies are inferior, so the robot will give everyone a wristband, and, if
they still have it at o1, a drink.
Theorem 7. The IY (h) in Equation 5 defines an unriggable event Y .
Proof. Equation 4 implies 0 ≤ IX(π0, s0, µ) ≤ 1, and Equation 5 then implies the same thing for
IY . Since IY is defined onHn, it defines an event Y .
To see that IY is well defined on any h, independent of future actions, it suffices to note that both
IX(π0, s, µ) and µ(s0 = s | h) have no dependence on π.
Proposition 9. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
Ra +Rd(Y ) = −Ip − Ii + IdIY − IdI¬Y ,
then it will give wristbands and drinks iff it believes the attendee is mature.
Proof. Let us focus first on Rd(IY ). Since IY (h) = µ(s0 = m | h) is unriggable,Rd(IY ) depends
solely on the probability of s0 = m (the probability that the attendee is mature) and a1, the action
that gives a drink or not. The optimal policy for a1, after a history h1, is obviously to do g iff
µ(s0 = m | h1) > 1/2, and ¬g otherwise.
The action a0 cannot affect the expectation of IY , but it can affect what a1 the robot will subse-
quently define to be optimal. Then say that the action a0 = a is non-informative if the optimal
action a1 is already known after o0a0, without having to wait for the observation o1.
Then, for maximising Rd(h), it is clear that non-informative actions cannot be better than infor-
mative ones. This is because the expected reward of a non-informative action is equal to taking an
informative action and closing your eyes to o1. Since extra information always has a non-negative
value to a Bayesian agent, this cannot improve the situation.
Now assume o0 = lm; then µ(s0 = m | lm) = 2/3 and µ(s0 = ¬m | lm) = 1/3. If the robot
chooses g or ¬g, the probability of seeing a penalty – wp or ¬wp – is at most 1/100. Therefore if
the robot chooses g or ¬g and doesn’t see a penalty at o1, the probability of µ(s0 = m | lma0o1)
does not change enough to put it below 0. Therefore, in that case, the optimal action a1 is g, giving
a drink.
If h1 = lm¬gwp, the agent knows that s0 = m, so the agent will still choose a1 = g. However, if
h1 = lmg¬wp, then the agent knows that s0 = ¬m, so the agent will choose a1 = ¬g instead.
These cover all the options for g and ¬g, therefore ¬g is non-informative given o0 = lm, while g is
informative. It’s trivial to see that i is also (very) informative.
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Now let’s add Ra into the reward. The probability of a penalty given g and o0 = lm is 1/300 (the
product of 1/3, the chance of s0 = ¬m, times 1/100, the probability of the human checking ID).
The probability of a penalty given ¬g is 2/300.
Therefore, because of Ip in Ra, g has a higher expected reward on Ra than ¬g, and is more infor-
mative on Rd(Y ): it therefore has a higher expected reward on Ra +Rd(Y ).
Though i is informative, it is easy to check that the −1 reward coming from −Ii overwhelms this
effect: it has an expected reward of 2/3(−1+1)+1/3(−1+0) = −1/3. In contrast, the non-optimal
policy of g (wristband) blindly followed by ¬g (no drink) has an expected reward of −1/100 + 0
(the probability of a penalty given ¬g); the optimal policy’s expected reward would be even higher.
Now, if we had o0 = ¬lm, then the same argument would show that a0 = ¬g has higher expected
value than a0 = g, and higher expected value than −2/3, the expected reward given a0 = i.
So the robot will give a wristband iff o0 = lm, ie iff it believes the attendee is more likely to be
mature at that point, then give a drink iff µ(s0 = m | h1) > 1, ie iff it believes the attendee is more
likely to be mature at that point.
Theorem 11. If R(Y0, Y1) is a causal counterfactual reward forX , R0, and R1, then:
• Ifminpi I
pi
X(h) = 1, R(Y0, Y1)-maximising agents follow a policy which maximises R1.
• Ifminpi I
pi
¬X(h) = 1, R(Y0, Y1)-maximising agents follow a policy which maximises R0.
Proof. If minpi I
pi
X(h) = 1, then, by definition, IY0(h) = 0. Since IY0 maps into [0, 1], this means
that for any hn ≥ h with µ(hn | h) 6= 0, IY0(hn) = 0. Hence IY0(h
′) = 0 for all h′ ≥ h with
µ(h′ | h) 6= 0.
Thus IY0 = 0 for all possible future histories from h. So R(Y0, Y1) becomes IY1R1 + 0, with
IY1 > 0 from now on. Since IY1 and R1 are independent, the expected value of IY1R1 under a
policy π is:
∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | h, π)IY1R1(hn) =
( ∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | h, π)R1(hn)
)
·
( ∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | h, π)IY1(hn)
)
=
( ∑
hn∈Hn
µ(hn | h, π)R1(hn)
)
· IY1(h),
since IY1 is unriggable. Thus maximising R(Y0, Y1) in this situation is equivalent to maximising
R1.
The proof forminpi I
pi
¬X(h) = 1 and R0 is the same.
Proposition 12. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
Ra +Rd(Y0, Y1) = −Ip − Ii + IdIY0 − IdIY1 ,
then it will give wristbands, and drinks, iff it believes the attendee is mature.
Proof. Lemma 18 shows that Y0 and Y1 define causal counterfactuals for ¬Xw, Id and −Id, as
defined in Definition 10.
Thus IY0 and Id are independent. Then, when choosing action a0, the expectation of IY0Id(h2) is
the product of the expectations of IY0 (which is independent of a0, since IY0 is unriggable) and the
expectation of Id (which is independent of a0, as it depends only on a1). The same goes for−IY1Id.
Thus with a0, it will maximise Ra independently of the future, by giving the wristband if o0 = lm,
and not giving it if o0 = l¬m: thus giving drinks iff it thinks the attendee is mature.
After observation o1, then one of Iw = IXw or I¬w = IX¬w is 1, which triggers the condition
of Theorem 11: so the robot will behave the same way after o1 as if it were maximising Rd(Xw),
namely give the drinks iff the attendee has a wristband.
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But when will the attendee have a wristband? This will be either if the robot has given them one
and it hasn’t been removed (thus the robot thought the attendee was mas mature, and still thinks it),
or if the robot didn’t give them one and now they have one (thus the robot thought the attendee was
immature, but now knows they are mature). Hence it will give them a drink iff it thinks they are
mature.
Proposition 14. If the robot aims to maximise the reward
I¬Z(Ra +Rd(Xw))
then it will give wristbands, and drinks, iff it believes the attendee is mature.
Proof. By definition, I¬ZIw (a human checked ID, and the attendee has a wristband – hence the
attendee is mature) is equal to IY0Iw (a human checked ID, the attendee is mature, and the attendee
has a wristband). By the same argument, I¬ZI¬w = IY1I¬w
Similarly, I¬ZIp (a human checked ID, a penalty was given) is equal to Ip (a penalty was given –
only possible if a human checked ID).
If the robot choose action i, then the probability that the human checks ID is 1/100. Thus−I¬ZIi =
−Ii/100. Thus the whole reward can be re-written as
(−Ip − Ii/100) + IdIY0 − IdIY1 .
Then the proof of Proposition 12 will apply to this reward as well.
Note that the difference between −Ii and −Ii/100 is not enough to make the robot choose i, since
i is a certainty of a loss of 1/100 via −Ii/100, while choosing g after lm or ¬g after ¬lm only has
a probability of 1/3 · 1/100 (probability of wrong maturity and human checking ID) of a loss of 1
via −Ip. Thus the expected loss from i is 1/100, while the expected loss from giving the wristband
iff the human looks mature is 1/300.
Theorem 17. Let πA be a policy for a reward transitioning agent as in Definition 16. Then:
• Form ≤ t, πA(ht) is optimal for maximising expected total reward according to R.
• Form > t, πA(ht) is optimal for maximising expected total reward according to R
′.
Proof. For m > t, the expected value of R′ + C is the expected value of R′, since C has already
been allocated. So form > t, πA(hm) is optimal for maximisingR
′.
Form ≤ t, define
V (R, π, hm, t+ 1) =
∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
µ(ht+1 | hm, π)V (R, π, ht+1),
V ∗(R, π, hm, t+ 1) =
∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
µ(ht+1 | hm, π)V
∗(R, ht+1),
as the expected values of the future V (R, π, ht+1) and future V
∗(R, ht+1), given the current hm
and policy π.
Since C(R,R′, ht+1) = V
∗(R, ht+1) − V (R
′, πA, ht+1) by Equation 6, the expected value of
R′ + C before t+ 1, on history hm and given πA, is:
V (R′ + C, πA, hm) = V (R
′, πA, hm) + V
∗(R, πA, hm, t+ 1)− V (R
′, πA, hm, t+ 1). (7)
For any hn ∈ Hn, µ(hn | hm) =
∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
µ(hn | ht+1)µ(ht+1 | hm); thus V (R
′, πA, hm, t+
1) = V (R′, πA, hm), and Equation 7 reduces to
V ∗(R, πA, hm, t+ 1).
This is the value ofR if the robot follows policy πA up until time t+1, and the optimal policy forR
after that. This is obviously maximised by πA being the optimal policy forR up until time t+1.
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C Policy transition example: learning Q-values
Corrective rewards (see Section 5) are also useful when we want our agents to learn the right action-
values in cases where the reward stays the same, R = R′, but a change in policy occurs at time t.
Orseau and Armstrong (2016) applies corrective rewards to Q-learning and Sarsa (Sutton and Barto,
1998).
At time t, the agent is in state st, takes action at via policy π, gets reward R(s, a), and ends up in
state st+1. In that state, it follows π
′, to take action a′t+1, while π would have taken action at+1.
Both Q-learning and Sarsa require as parameters a learning rate αt ≥ 0 and a discount γ ≤ 1 to
learn action-values, which are updated according to:
Q(st, at)← W (R, π, ht+1).
For Q-learning, thisW is
W (R, π, ht+1) =(1 − αt)Q(st, at) + αt
(
R(st, at) + γmax
a
Q(st+1, a)
)
,
While for Sarsa,W is:
W (R, π, ht+1) =(1− αt)Q(st, at) + αt
(
R(st, at) + γQ(st+1, at+1)
)
.
In Q-learning, which is off-policy, W has no dependence π meaning C = W (R, π, ht+1) −
W (R, π′, ht+1) = 0 and there is no need for any corrective rewards.
For Sarsa, the effect of π appears only in the at+1 term
C0(π,R, π
′, R, ht+1) = W (R, π, ht+1)−W (R, π
′, ht+1) = αtγ
[
Q(st+1, at+1)−Q(st+1, a
′
t+1)
]
.
Modifying Sarsa by adding in the C means that at time-step t the agent updates Q-values as if it
were following π rather than π′. So corrective rewards allow Sarsa to learn action-values correctly
under a policy transition.
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